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### Plan

#### The United States federal government should end the economic embargo on Cuba.

### Advantage One is Human Rights

#### The embargo is destroying human rights in Cuba – denies people access to basic needs, services, and universally agreed upon rights.

Coll 07 Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul College of Law [Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Fall, 2007, 12 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 199]

The Cuban embargo is not a limited set of economic sanctions affecting a few carefully targeted areas of Cuba's government and society. Instead, it is a comprehensive program that prohibits virtually all American trade, investment, travel, cultural and human contact with Cuba outside of a few narrow exceptions. Moreover, throughout the embargo's 47-year history, different U.S. administrations have worked aggressively to expand the embargo's extraterritorial reach in order to pressure as many countries as possible to reduce their contacts with Cuba. The embargo's extensive extraterritorial reach and power as well as its disproportionate nature are magnified by Cuba's weakness as a small Caribbean island of 11 million people, its peculiar geographical location only 90 miles from the United States, and the U.S.'s own international economic and financial preeminence. As currently structured, the embargo has comprehensive, widespread, and indiscriminate effects on the economic, social, and family conditions of the Cuban people that cause it to violate widely recognized human rights norms as well as the basic obligation of states to ensure that sanctions imposed for the sake of promoting human rights do not have the opposite effect of harming the human rights of innocent people. n259

Apologists for the embargo point out that the embargo has only a limited impact on the Cuban economy because Cuba is free to trade with virtually every other country in the world. n260 This argument overlooks two key [\*236] issues. First, the U.S. government has not contented itself with denying the benefits of trade and investment to Cuba. Instead, throughout most of the embargo's history, U.S. administrations have exerted enormous pressures on foreign governments and companies to discourage all economic contact with Cuba. A typical example occurred in the early 1990s when Cuba, then in the midst of a severe economic depression caused by the collapse of its ally, the Soviet Union, attempted to modernize its antiquated 40-year old telephone network. Grupos Domo, a Mexican-based conglomerate with substantial economic ties to the United States, began negotiations with Cuba over what would have been a multi-billion dollar deal but eventually withdrew from negotiations as a result of enormous pressure by the U.S. government. n261 Ultimately, Cuba found a group of willing international investor partners, most of whom insisted on anonymity in order to avoid possible American retaliation. Thus, the reach of the U.S. embargo extends significantly beyond U.S.-Cuba trade relations, and negatively impacts Cuba's relations with other countries as well. Second, since Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the subsequent Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the embargo has sharply increased its extraterritorial reach. Thousands of foreign companies that could trade with Cuba before 1992 are no longer allowed to do so by virtue of being subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Although the European Union and other U.S. allies responded to the Helms-Burton Act by enacting "blocking statutes" and "claw-back" provisions n262, Helms-Burton has nonetheless had a [\*237] chilling effect on trade and investment with Cuba. n263 Thus, the embargo's economic impact must be measured not only in terms of the way it has isolated Cuba from U.S. markets but also by its effect on the willingness of many private international entities to do business with Cuba.

Because the embargo has such far-reaching effects on foreign trade and investment with Cuba, its effects on human rights are similarly far-reaching, encompassing such areas as public health, nutrition, education, culture, and even fundamental family rights. In general, economic sanctions affect education in the sanctioned country by decreasing access to supplies, which ultimately leads to the deterioration of infrastructure. n264 The Cuban government estimates that the embargo has cost Cuba an estimated average of $ 2.19 billion a year since 1959, a figure that may be quite conservative in light of several factors. n265 First, the embargo is unusually comprehensive and affects every area of Cuba's economic life. Second, it deprives Cuba of the benefits from economies of scale and geographical advantages associated with the U.S. market. Third, the dollar's role as the international currency of choice, the preeminent role of U.S. banks in international trade especially in the western hemisphere, and the embargo's extraterritorial reach combine to [\*238] increase substantially the costs to Cuba of trading with many other countries.

The most recent United Nations report on human rights in Cuba referred to the U.S. embargo as one of the "factors hindering the realization of human rights in Cuba," and noted that: The restrictions imposed by the embargo help to deprive Cuba of vital access to medicines, new scientific and medical technology, food, chemical water treatment and electricity. The disastrous effects of the embargo in terms of the economic, social and cultural rights of the Cuban people have been denounced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization ... . n266

Thus, though the embargo is now promoted as a means of improving human rights, the embargo has had the opposite effect of harming human rights.

#### Despite small changes, United States maintains an embargo that restricts the flow of goods like medical supplies into Cuba.

CNN 13 (Guzmán, Emmy award winning journalist, Sandra, “Jay-Z and Beyoncé's trip to Cuba isn't the problem, the embargo is,” CNN, May 8 2013, Online: ¶ http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/07/opinion/guzman-beyonce-jay-z-cuba/index.html)

The few but very influential pro-embargo lobby have put a stranglehold on a lucid discussion ¶ surrounding Cuba. Five decades of failed policy later, our nation is being held hostage unable ¶ to have a cogent discussion on anything Cuba-related.¶ The U.S. embargo has not and will not work. Put in place in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, the policy is stuck in a time warp that ¶ has nothing to do with modern-day reality. The most enduring embargo in modern day history is a ¶ remnant of a Cold War past when the Soviet Union was the enemy and the world was on the brink of ¶ nuclear war. The thinking was that financial sanctions, which included a ban on travel by ¶ American citizens, would collapse the island economy and force people to revolt against Fidel ¶ Castro.¶ Over the years, these sanctions have been eased or toughened depending on political ¶ winds. In 1992, disgraced New Jersey Rep. Robert Torricelli was behind one the cruelest acts ¶ which banned, among many things, food and medicine sales to Cuba and prevented Cuban American families from sending cash to their relatives. These were tough times and seeing many ¶ friends and families suffer because they couldn't visit their elderly mothers more than once every ¶ three years, or being prevented from sending them needed supplies, was very painful. Restrictions ¶ have eased under President Barack Obama but there is still a major ban. It's 2013 and we need to debate Cuban policy earnestly. Members of Congress must ¶ stop the cowardice around the issue and stop humoring the delusions of passionate folks ¶ stuck in the 1960s for political votes and favor. The pro-embargo folks are ignoring the policy's ¶ epic failure and fail to recognize that U.S. policy has played into the hands of the Castro ¶ brothers, who have sinisterly used it to make the case to their people that if Cuba is starving ¶ and the island economy can't grow, it's because of this U.S. policy.

#### The embargo’s attempts to boost human rights has backfired – removing the embargo would boost human rights, force the regime to stop abusing them, and provide the impetus to improve them through internal change.

Amash 12 International Relations at UC San Diego [Brandon Amash, Evaluating the Cuban Embargo, Prospect: Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, <http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/>]

Cuba has a long record of violating the fundamental human rights of freedom of opinion, thought, expression, and the right to dissent; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly protects these rights in Articles 19 and 21. Article 19 states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 21 similarly states that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country […]” (UDHR). The purpose of this proposal is to provide the United States with an alternative foreign policy approach toward Cuba that will improve human rights conditions and foster democracy in the country. Namely, I argue that the embargo policy should be abandoned and replaced with a policy based on modeling appropriate behavior, providing support and resources to developing democratic systems and encouraging participation in multilateral institutions. In the following pages, I will describe the historical context of the situation, critique the embargo policy and advocate for the normalization of relations with Cuba as a stronger approach to improving human rights and espousing democracy.

It is essential to carefully consider this proposal as a viable policy alternative for promoting democracy and protecting human rights in Cuba because the current embargo policy has proven to be ineffective in advancing these goals. Developing more effective approaches to similar situations of democratization and promotion of ideals has been a foreign policy goal of the United States since before the Cold War. However, despite the vast shifts in the international climate following the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Cuba has not adapted. As such, this proposal highlights the need for a fresh policy toward our neighbor and bitter rival.

§ 2. Historical Context of the Problem:

The United States and Cuba have been on unstable terms since the colonization of both countries by the British and Spanish Empires, respectively. Following Cuba’s independence from Spain and the ensuing Spanish-American War, Cuban-American relations began to deteriorate: Cubans resented American intervention in their independence, afraid of leaving one empire only to be conquered by another. However, the human rights violations in question did not become a problem until after the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s, following the rise of Fidel Castro’s communist regime. After the revolution, Cuban laws imposed limits on the freedoms of expression and association, effectively undermining the basic human rights of freedom of opinion and dissent. According to Clark, De Fana and Sanchez, “given the totalitarian nature of the country, in which all communications media are in the hands of the omnipotent State-Party, it is physically impossible to express any dissenting political opinion […]” (Clark 65). Threatened by these blatantly antidemocratic policies, America had to do something.

The United States placed trade embargoes, economic sanctions, and travel bans on Cuba in an attempt to combat the communist regime and human rights violations (Carter 334). Today, diplomatic relations with Cuba remain extremely strained, although America’s embargo policy has tightened and relaxed in concert with its domestic political climate. Most recently, President Obama has reversed “tighter restrictions on Cuban American family travel and remittances,” as well as announcing “that U.S. telecommunications companies may seek licenses to do business in Cuba” (Carter 336). However, despite the ever-evolving policy and the fluid international climate, little progress has been made in improving the human rights situation in Cuba, let alone the overall promotion of democratic ideals. The embargo policy is based on the idea “that economic denial will bring about continued economic failure in Cuba, thereby creating popular dissatisfaction with the government while simultaneously weakening the government’s ability to repress this popular dissent, leading to the destabilization of the regime and, ultimately, its collapse” (Seaman 39). In the following section, I will explain how these objectives have not been realized.

§ 3. Critique of Policy Options:

Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that “the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards” (Ayubi 1). These goals and standards, in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human rights. However, the sanctions that the United States has placed on Cuba in the past half century have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba.

§ 3.1: The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights. Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy. Moreover, the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation.

§ 3.2: American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable (Fontaine 30). While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever.

§ 3.3: The current policy may drag the United States into a military conflict with Cuba. Military conflict may be inevitable in the future if the embargo’s explicit goal — creating an insurrection in Cuba to overthrow the government — is achieved, and the United States may not be ready to step in. As Ratliff and Fontaine detail, “Americans are not prepared to commit the military resources […]” (Fontaine 57), especially after unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much like America’s current situation with isolated rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, Cuba’s isolation may also lead to war for other reasons, like the American occupation of Guantanamo Bay. These consequences are inherently counterproductive for the democratization of Cuba and the improvement of human rights.

§ 4. Policy Recommendations:

Although America’s previous policies of intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba, not all options have been exhausted. One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.

§ 4.1: Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.

§ 4.2: With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.

§ 4.3: Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.

§ 4.4: A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions. As discussed above, engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations.

§ 5. Conclusions:

Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations. After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.

#### Sanctions are human rights violations the consequences are known

Marks 99 Frangois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health [Stephen P. Marks, Economic Sanctions as Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Political and Public Health Imperatives, American Journal of Public Health, October 1999, Vol. 89, No. 10]

It is tempting to consider that because (a) the rights to an adequate standard of living, to physical and mental health, to just remuneration, to education, to family life, and to other related rights are universally recognized and (b) serious studies by public health experts substantiate the claim that these rights have been violated as a result of economic sanctions, then (c) the "senders" of sanctions regimes-that is, the governmental and intergovernmental decision makers in Congress, the White House, the UN Security Council and the OAS-are perpetrators of human rights violations. The CESR and Gibbons in her book on sanctions in Haiti come close to succumbing to that temptation, the former stressing that "the [Security] Council remains accountable to human rights principles regardless of the conduct of the Iraqi government"30 and the latter claiming that states that enforce sanctions in Haiti "inadvertently participated in violating the rights of Haitian citizens."31

The identification of senders of sanctions with perpetrators of human rights violations is not so simple, for 2 reasons. First, as a matter of law, responsibility for a violation can only be attributed to a duty holder, in most cases a state that has ratified a treaty establishing the obligation in question, and neither the Security Council nor the UN in general is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), or any other relevant convention. Moreover, treaties impose obligations on states to take measures within their jurisdiction- that is, within the national territory and, for a limited range of matters, for its nationals outside the territory-but not for foreigners in their own countries. Thus, the members of the Security Council have no treaty-based duty to ensure treaty rights for the citizens of Haiti, Iraq, Serbia, or other targeted countries.

One can hold states accountable, however, for actions that defeat the object and purpose of a treaty to which they are a party (or even that they have signed and not yet ratified, as is the case with the United States with respect to the ICESCR), and the aim of protecting the human rights set out in the ICESCR is part of that object and purpose. Such is the intention of the following provision of the Maastricht guidelines, adopted by a group of 30 human rights experts in January 1997:

19. The obligations of States to protect economic, social and cultural rights extend also to their participation in international organizations, where they act collectively. It is particularly important for States to use their influence to ensure that violations do not result from the programmes and policies of the organizations of which they are members.32

The language is not that of firm obligation, but it is designed to acknowledge the importance of states' using their influence to prevent violations-for example, through decisions of the Security Council or the OAS to impose sanctions. There is, moreover, a duty upon the Security Council to "act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,"33 among which is the purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."34 Significantly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which monitors the application of the ICESCR, requires the state or entity imposing sanctions to take these rights "fully into account" when designing the sanctions regime, to monitor effectively the situation in the targeted country with respect to these rights, and to take steps "to respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted country."35 In the case of Haiti, the UN and the OAS did take human rights into account by creating the Human Rights Civilian Observation Mission (MICIVIH), which Gibbons describes as "a positive action ... that was quite different in nature from the negative action of sanctions."36 However, she also notes that its mandate excluded economic, social, and cultural rights, as a result of "pragmatic decisions" that "respect for Haitians' economic and social rights would be sacrificed for the sake of advancing their political and civil rights." This dilemma emerged in the functioning of MICIVIH's Medical Unit, an unprecedented addition to a human rights component of a peace operation, which ran into difficulty in trying to reconcile mission headquarters' efforts to restrict its role to documenting abuse of civil and political rights with the participating medical practitioners' duty to provide care when the situation called for medical assistance.37

The second problem with the senders as- perpetrators argument is both moral and legal: Senders of sanctions cannot be held responsible unless they intentionally seek to violate the rights in question or pursue policies that are so blatantly harmful to those rights that they fail to meet a minimum standard of compliance. The humanitarian exemptions that have been voted with sanctions in almost every case, and the supplemental humanitarian assistance programs funded by the "senders," as well as their public statements of concern for the plight of civilian populations, make it difficult to find willful intent on the senders' part. Gibbons' reference to states "inadvertently" participating in violations,38 and the use she and Garfield make of "unintentionally" in their article in this issue of the Journal, are indicative of the problems of accountability.

Nevertheless, the moral outrage of those who would like to hold senders of sanctions accountable as perpetrators of violations is justified, and passing blame to Saddam Hussein, Lt Gen Cedras, or Slobodan Milosevic is not enough. As a study commissioned by the UN concluded, "the amount of information available today on the devastating economic, social, and humanitarian impact of sanctions no longer permits [policymakers] to entertain the notion of 'unintended effects."'39 A member of the Security Council has declared that "it is disingenuous to talk of 'unintended side effects' when everybody knows that the sector most affected by sanctions, as presently applied, are precisely civilian populations. There is nothing surprising or unintended about it."40 His statement was in reaction to a "non-paper" (an informal document used as a flexible tool for negotiation) by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) that insisted that sanctions regimes should "minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments oftargeted countries."4l

#### Human Rights are an absolute good – must act to protect them in all instances

Human Rights Watch 97 [An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement, <http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html>]

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of [hu]mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law...

These are the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 without a dissenting vote. It is the first multinational declaration mentioning human rights by name, and the human rights movement has largely adopted it as a charter. I'm quoting them here because it states as well or better than anything I've read what human rights are and why they are important.

The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors.

In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Catholic. Then they came for me... and by that time, there was no one to speak up for anyone.

-- Martin Niemoeller, Pastor,

German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church

Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.

-- Dwight D. Eisenhower

President of the United States

"I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."

-- Albert Einstein

**Focus on magnitude masks everyday instances of violence – you have a moral obligation to place a disproportionately high value on structural violence.**

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, Professors of Anthropology @ Berkeley & UPenn, 2004**  
(Nancy and Philippe, Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight "messy" Part VII is central to (his anthology's thesis. It encom- passes everything from the (outinized, burcaucrattzed, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil {Schcper-Hughcs, Chapter 33) ro elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly's version of US apartheid in Chicago's South Side I'Klincnberg, Chapter 38) to the racializcd class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the "smelly" working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdctcr- mine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US "inner city" to be normalized iBourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada. Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. **Close attention to the "little" violences produced in the structures**, habituscs, and mentalites **of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities.** More important, **it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of "violence studies" that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity.** Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of "small wars and invisible genocides" (see also Schcpcr- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. **The violence continuum** also **refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons** and assuming the license - even the duty - **to kill, maim, or soul-murder**. We realize that in referring to a \ iolenci\* and a genocide continuum we arc flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (seeKuper l985;Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, **it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times**. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in ovcrextending the concept of "genocide" into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might noc ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing practices and sentiments daily enacted as norma- tive behavior by "ordinary" good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impover- ished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the "small wars and invisible genocides" to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are "invisible" genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu's partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By **including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of "normal" social practices** - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu **forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression.** Similarly, Basaglia's notion of "peacetime crimes" - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibil- ity that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on "illegal aliens" versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee "Trail of Tears." Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal "stability" is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied "strangle-holds." Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic "peace" possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindusrrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man. the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the "normative" socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end **it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among Otherwise good-enough humans and** that we need to **exercise** a defensive **hypervigilance to the less dramatic,** permitted, and even rewarded **everyday acts of violence that render participa- tion in genocidal acts and policies possible** {under adverse political or economic conditions). perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dchumamzjtion. depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and rcification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin's view of late modem history as a chronic "state of emergency" (Taussig, Chapter 31). We arc trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Krving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twcnricth-ccntury radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other "total institutions." Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce gcnocidal-likc crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to "pseudo- speciation" as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human-a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes thai precede the sudden, "seemingly unintelligible" outbreaks of mass violence. **Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide**. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Schcper-Hughes Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of "angel-babies,"' and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by "symbolic violence," the violence that is often "mis-recognized" for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls "terror as usual." All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and "peace-time crimes." Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. **Violence**, Bourdieu insists, **is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible**. Lacan identifies "mcconnaissancc" as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family- farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42: see also Schcper Hughes, 2000b; Favrct-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, **we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of "controlling processes"** (Nader 1997b) **that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival**. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reificarion, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that **mass violence is part of a continuum**, and **that** it **is socially incremental** and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early "warning signs" (Charncy 1991), the "priming" (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the "genocidal continuum" (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable "social parasites" (the nursing home elderly, "welfare queens," undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Human rights framework transforms political calculations – makes poverty, violence, disease, and nuclear conflict unthinkable

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Because globalization promotes common values across nations and can make foreign problems, conditions, issues, and debates as vivid and captivating as national, state, and local ones, it contributes to a sense of world community. n99 It develops a feeling of empathy for the conditions of people abroad, enlarging the group of human beings that an individual will identify with. Globalization thus helps to bring alive persons in foreign lands, making them fellow human beings who simply live in different parts of the world rather than abstract statistics of deaths, poverty, and suffering. The convergence of basic political and economic values is thus fundamentally important because it helps to establish a common bond among people in different countries, facilitating understanding and encouraging cooperation. All other things being equal, the commonality among countries - whether in the form of basic values, culture, or language - enhances their attractiveness to each other. n100 In addition, convergence increases [\*461] the possibility that a transformation of attitude will take place for those who participate in transnational activities. People will begin to regard foreigners in distant lands with the same concern that they have for their fellow citizens. n101 They will endeavor to help these foreigners obtain basic political rights even though the status of political rights in other countries will have no tangible beneficial impact at home. n102 Convergence does not mean that there is a single model of a market economy, a single type of democracy, or a single platform of human rights. They exist in different forms, and nations may have different combinations of these forms. n103 [\*462]

A. The Perspective of One Human Race

The convergence of fundamental values through globalization has profound consequences because it increases the chance that a new perspective will develop, one which views membership in the human race as the most significant societal relationship, except for nationality. n104 A person owes his or her strongest collective loyalties to the various societies with which he or she most intensely identifies. Today, this societal identification can be based on numerous factors, including nationality, race, religion, and ethnic group. n105 While it is unlikely that nationality will be surpassed as the most significant societal relationship, globalization and the convergence of values may eventually convince people in different countries that the second most important social group is the human race, and not a person's racial, religious, or ethnic group. n106 One of the first steps in the formation of a society is the recognition by prospective members that they have common interests and bonds. An essential commonality is that they share some fundamental values. A second is that they identify themselves as members belonging to the same community on the basis of a number of common ties, including shared fundamental values. A third commonality is the universality of rights - the active application of the "golden rule" - by which members expect that all must be entitled to the same rights as well as charged with the same responsibilities to ensure that these rights are protected. Globalization promotes these three types of commonalities. Globalization establishes common ground by facilitating the almost universal acceptance of market economies, the widespread emergence of democratic governments, and the extensive approval of human rights. The most visible example is economic. With the end of the Cold War, the free market economy has clearly triumphed over the command economy in the battle of the [\*463] economic paradigms. Because some variant of a market economy has taken root in virtually all countries, there has been a convergence of sorts in economic systems. n107

Further, because it often requires exposure to and pervasive interaction with foreigners - many of whom share the same fundamental values - globalization can enlarge the group that one normally identifies with. Globalization makes many of its participants empathize with the conditions and problems of people who in earlier years would have been ignored as unknown residents of remote locations. This empathy often leads to sympathy and support when these people suffer unfairly. Finally, the combination of shared values and identification produce the third commonality, universality of rights. n108 Citizens of one country will often expect, and work actively to achieve, the same basic values in other countries. They will treat nationals of other nations as they would wish to be treated. The effects of shared values, identification, and universality of rights in globalization could have a pivotal long-term effect - the possibility that a majority of human beings will begin to believe that they are truly part of a single global society - the human race. This is not to say that people disbelieve the idea that the human race encompasses all human beings. Of course, they realize that there is only one human species. Rather, the human race does not usually rank high on the hierarchy of societies for most people. Smaller societies, especially those based on nationality, race, religion, or ethnicity, command more loyalty. n109 The idea of the human race, the broadest and all-inclusive category of the human species, is abstract and has little, if any, impact on the lives of human beings. To believe in the singular importance of the human race requires an attitudinal shift in which a person views the human race seriously. [\*464] This may occur because the convergence of values does not only mean that the people of different countries will share the same basic values. It may also lead to the greater promotion of these values for the people of other countries. Historically and certainly today, America and the other industrial democracies have attempted to foster democracy and human rights in other countries. n110 While some part of this effort has been attributable to "self interest," it has also been due to the empathy that the industrialized democracies have had for other countries. n111 The magnitude of these efforts in the future, as in the past, will depend not solely upon the available financial and human resources of the industrialized democracies. It will also depend upon their national will - a factor undoubtedly influenced by the intensity with which the people of the industrialized democracies identify with people in foreign lands. The perspective that the human race matters more than its component divisions would accelerate cooperative efforts among nations to attack global problems that adversely affect human rights and the quality of human life. n112 Obviously, there is no shortage of such problems. Great suffering still occurs in so many parts of the world, not just from internal armed conflicts, n113 but also from conditions of poverty. n114 There are severe health problems in much of the world which can be mitigated with relatively little cost. n115 There are the lives lost to the AIDS epidemic, and [\*465] the deaths and disabilities caused by land mines. n116 Russia, a nuclear superpower that could end life on this planet, has severe social, economic, and political problems. n117 Making the human race important would not just promote liberal democratic values but would also reduce human suffering and perhaps eliminate completely the risk of nuclear war.

#### Survival of the species is only possible by respecting Human Rights

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The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival:

[L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3

That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference:

Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [\*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5

Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.

### Advantage Two is Relations

#### Ending the embargo would expand credibility, US soft power, and improve US-Cuban relations.

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Conclusion

The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.

In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52

At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Cuba is key to Latin American relations, goodwill, solving anti-americanism and successful soft power

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Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.

The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.

Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity.

[\*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.

The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4

In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5

When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [\*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. n8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.

#### It would provide immediate and substantial benefits to the US image globally

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From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually respected.

Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This return of foreign investment will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were unilateral U.S. actions, an unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all countries to invest in Cuba again underscores the United States' position of desiring for all countries to participate in the global market place. It is difficult to imagine that the benefits of lifting the embargo will not be immediate and substantial in regards to the United States reputation in the world. Looking at the long-term benefits of removing the sanctions, the two benefits that stand out the most are trade and fuel.

#### Independently - Soft Power limits the size and frequency of conflicts around the world.

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Leadership by the United States, as the world's leading economy, its most powerful military force, and a leading democracy, is a key factor in limiting the frequency and destructiveness of great power, regional, and communal conflicts. The paradox of the post-cold war role of the United States is that it is the most powerful state in terms of both "hard" power resources (its economy and military forces) and "soft" ones (the appeal of its political system and culture), yet it is not so powerful that it can achieve all its international goals by acting alone. The United States lacks both the international and domestic prerequisites to resolve every conflict, and in each case its role must be proportionate to its interests at stake and the costs of pursuing them. Yet the United States can continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions to pursue shared security interests, whether or not the United States itself supplies large military forces. The U.S. role will thus not be that of a lone global policeman; rather, the United States can frequently serve as the sheriff of the posse, leading shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns within the legitimizing framework of international organizations. This requires sustained attention to the infrastructure and institutional mechanisms that make U.S. leadership effective and joint action possible: forward stationing and preventive deployments of U.S. and allied forces, prepositioning of U.S. and allied equipment, advance planning and joint training to ensure interoperability with allied forces, and steady improvement in the conflict resolution abilities of an interlocking set of bilateral alliances, regional security organizations and alliances, and global institutions.

#### Action now is key – removing the embargo would boost overall Latin relations and undermine the perception of US isolation globally

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[\*193] One of the lasting legacies of America's Cuba policy is that it isolates the U.S. and represents stubbornness in the face of ineffectiveness. After the 2008 election the calls to change U.S. policy toward Cuba were echoed by both allies and non-allies, including Brazil, n9 Colombia, n10 and Mexico, as well as Venezuela n11 and Bolivia. n12 The European Union has also expressed its opposition to "the extraterritoriality extension of the United States embargo." n13 Each year the UN considers a resolution condemning America's economic embargo of Cuba, and each year the measure is overwhelmingly adopted. In 2008 the vote was 184-4, meaning the U.S. policy to isolate Cuba has had the ironic effect of isolating the United States. Additionally, the travel ban may violate multiple articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. n14 Fortunately, for three reasons, the opportunity is ripe for a fresh approach to this old problem.

First, leadership changes in both countries allow each to signal a new way forward without necessarily repudiating long-held positions. Both governments have signaled a willingness to talk, which is already a step in the right direction. Specifically, within the United States, demographic changes in the Cuban-American community have led to attitudinal changes toward U.S.-Cuban relations. Florida International University's yearly polls have shown a trend whereby an increasing number of Cuban-Americans are opposed to the current U.S. policy of economic and political isolation.

In 2008, those polls indicated that a majority of Cuban-Americans opposed the restrictions on family travel and remittances. n15 These polls also indicated that long-term demographic trends are breaking in the Democrats' favor: the divide is now between older Cuban Americans who still vote Republican, and the younger generation, increasingly more numerous, who lean Democrat. Not only did President Obama outpace Senator John Kerry's [\*194] 2004 performance by ten points, but he won the twenty-nine or younger Cuban-American vote with fifty-five percent. n16 This shift in public opinion, combined with the fact that President Obama won Florida's electoral votes during the 2008 election despite narrowly losing the Cuban vote, gives the Administration a freer hand to construct a new policy with relatively little political costs.

Moreover, migration from Cuba has picked up pace in recent years, suggesting that the aging hardliners will continue to lose clout relative to voting power. According to the Institute of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, over 131,000 Cubans have arrived and settled in South Florida since 2005. n17 In fact, a policy that eventually normalizes relations with Cuba would probably carry votes in Florida, and the rest of the south. n18 These domestic changes mean that the U.S. can more easily reorient its Latin American policy to encourage constructive engagement that inspires optimism and hope rather than fear and anger.

Second, reforms recently enacted in Cuba indicate that the post Fidel Castro leadership is more likely to embrace pragmatism. In recent years, and especially since Raul Castro took over the presidency from his brother Fidel, Cuba's leadership has slightly moderated its political repression. While Cuba still holds political prisoners in custody, the total number is down from 316 in July 2006, when Raul took the helm from his brother, to less than 170 today - the lowest total since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. n19 However, these political changes have been small, and do not yet represent structural or fundamental reforms in the long term, especially since they are all easily reversible. Nevertheless, these political changes, combined with small economic liberalizations in the agricultural, technological, and tourist sectors, represent the first significant reforms under the new leadership of Raul Castro.

[\*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.

#### Latin American relations are vital to the US. Needed to combat global problems like proliferation, climate change, and insure economic growth. Only engagement solves

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

The Need for a Hemispheric Partnership

Historically, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional—let alone global—challenges. Mutual distrust is partly to blame. Also, the LAC countries were often not ready to make stable commitments. The United States had other preoccupations and did not make hemispheric partnership a priority. Problems and solutions were seen from Washington as country-specific and were managed mostly on a country-bycountry basis through bilateral channels. Meanwhile, multilateral forums—such as the Organization of American States and the summits of hemispheric leaders—ran out of steam, became mired in confrontation, or remained underresourced.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.

It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits.

Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future.

For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

The second change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their international economic relations. Their range of trading and investment partners is expanding, with China in particular playing a prominent role in the region. Chinese imports from the LAC countries increased twentyfold between 1990 and 2005, while Chinese exports to the region grew even faster, from $620 million in 1990 to $37 billion in 2005. Latin America is also attracting significant foreign investment from nontraditional sources. Between just 2003 and 2005, the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in the LAC region increased by 40 percent. China has become a key buyer of commodities, driving up prices and reversing the long-term decline in the region’s terms of trade. Meanwhile, the Caribbean countries have recently signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union, immediately opening all European markets and gradually opening Caribbean ones. With more valuable exports and less expensive manufactured imports, living standards in the LAC region have improved significantly.

At the same time, many LAC countries have moved beyond their traditional reliance on resources from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil now enjoy investment-grade status from credit-rating agencies and in recent years have been able to raise capital readily in international markets. The same is true of several other countries, including Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay, which until the recent financial crisis enjoyed ready access to private international capital. Regionally owned institutions, such as the Andean Development Corporation and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, have also reduced the region’s dependence on traditional sources of capital.

Some Latin American countries are investing abroad on an unprecedented scale. In 2006, for example, Brazil invested more abroad ($28 billion) than it received in foreign direct investment ($19 billion). In Chile, private pension funds and the government have become active international investors. Surpluses have allowed Venezuela to inject billions of dollars into other countries, particularly through subsidized oil exports. Many Latin American multinationals—such as Brazil’s Vale, Gerdau, and Odebrecht; and Mexico’s CEMEX, America Movil, and Grupo FEMSA—have become global corporate giants. The current crisis may no doubt affect the relative magnitude of these investments, but economic relationships in the hemisphere will continue to diversify as the world economy recovers.

The third change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their political and diplomatic relations. The most notable example is Brazil, which has opened thirty-two new embassies in the past five years. Together with Venezuela, Brazil is playing a more active political role in the region through the Union of South American Nations, which is already active at the presidential level and is expected to become a key forum for the discussion of defense issues. Mexico and Brazil are also playing prominent roles in international forums and organizations, including the finance ministers’ Group of Twenty and the trade ministers’ Group of Twenty. Brazil has announced its intention to join the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries and the Paris Club. Chile and Brazil are expected to become members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the not-too-distant future. Mexico, Peru, and Chile are active members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In sum, this diversification of political and economic relations reflects many LAC countries’ new confidence in their capacity to chart their own course in the world.

Their enhanced confidence and autonomy will make many LAC countries much less responsive to U.S. policies that are perceived as patronizing, intrusive, or prescriptive, and they will be more responsive to policies that engage them as partners on issues of mutual concern. Also, the LAC countries’ diversification of economic and political relations means that Washington will have to compete with governments both outside and within the region for regional influence. In particular, Brasília and Caracas are both vying for leadership in South America; and though they may have different visions for regional integration and different ways to approach other governments, they agree that Washington should play a more limited role in their part of the world.

The fourth change is that, today, the LAC countries are better positioned to act as reliable partners. Despite remaining governance challenges, the vast majority of these countries are stable democracies for which competitive elections and peaceful transitions of power are the norm, not the exception. Throughout these countries, civil society groups now participate extensively in the policymaking process, and there is much less tolerance of violence as a means of political expression.

Economic progress has also made the LAC countries more reliable partners. Leaders, including some on the left, are committed to fiscal responsibility. Most central banks are now independent bodies focused on inflation control. Exchange rates largely reflect market forces. As a result, many LAC countries can now look beyond their borders and commit to sustained partnerships and responsibilities on regional and global issues.

In sum, the countries of the LAC region have made significant strides in economic and social development and will continue to prosper even if U.S. leaders remain disengaged. Washington must decide whether it wants to actively reengage and benefit from the region’s dynamism and resources or be sidelined as other economic and political actors fill the void left by its absence.

#### U.S. Latin American relations are at a crossroads.

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Simply addressing an unfinished agenda is not enough. Both the United States and Latin America need to do more to exploit the enormous untapped opportunities of their relationship in economics, trade, and energy. They need to work together to deal with global and regional problems. And they need to project common values, including peace, democracy, human rights, expansion of equal opportunity, and social mobility. They need to breathe new life and vigor into hemispheric relations.

If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphere-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship.

There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyone’s interests and wellbeing. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations.

#### Ignore warming critics – action is key, the science is indisputable

Pittock 10—led the Climate Impact Group in CSIRO until his retirement in 1999. He contributed to or was the lead author of all four major reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. He was awarded a Public Service Medal in 1999 and is CSIRO Honorary Fellow. (Barrie, Climate Change: The Science, Impacts, and Solutions, 2010, pg. 240)

Is the science credible?

As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, there are many uncertainties in relation to climate change. Nevertheless, the overwhelming body of evidence from relevant scientists is that there is a high probability that human-induced global warming, with associated changes in other climatic conditions, is happening. Moreover, the evidence is that warming will continue, at an accelerating pace, through the twenty-first century and beyond, unless urgent measures are taken to slow and eventually reverse the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

These conclusions are hotly contested by a relatively small number of contrarians, discussed in Chapter 4, who for various reasons accuse so-called "˜establishment scientists' of bias and poor science. Genuine sceptics exist and are welcomed, as they keep scientists on their toes and ensure that what is accepted is well based and relevant to the real world. However, contrarians often present misleading arguments, and frequently seize upon any discussion of uncertainty as an excuse for dismissing the whole topic, rather than arguing for a balanced policy of risk management. Too often contrarians repeat old arguments that have already been thoroughly discredited.

#### Warming risks extinction

Tickell 08 (Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange>)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.